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Such piecemeal diffusion of administrative authority and responsi-
bility over a common resource is unrealistic, antiquated and wasteful.
The scope and severity of the problem require a comprehensive study
of the entire legislative framework within which our water resources
are now administered, with a view toward long range reforms. It is a
task worthy of the most careful attention of the Kentucky Department
of Conservation in performing its function of designing governmental
policy in this area.*
* (Editors Note: Since this note was prepared the Kentucky legislature estab-
lished a watershed development program by enacting Senate Bill 95. The act
which became effective in July, 1956,'provides that the program be administered
by formation of watershed sub-districts. The extent to which provisions of this
act satisfy the needs identified by this note will be treated supplementally in a
subsequent issue of the Kentucky Law Journal.)
William E. Bivin
EFFECT OF THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT ON DEATH
TAXATION OF A NON-RESIDENT PARTNER'S INTEREST
When Kentucky adopted the Uniform Partnership Act in 1954, it
became the 34th state' to get on the bandwagon and provide a com-
prehensive and studied statutory framework under which partnerships
might be formed and conduct business. For the most part the Act
simply codified common law concepts. But when jurisdictions applied
a different rule to solve a particular problem, the drafters, in order to
achieve the desired uniformity, were forced to choose the best reasoned
of the views and incorporate that view into the Act.
2
This paper will explore one such choice of divergent state rules,
and its possible effect upon the Kentucky inheritance tax laws. Speci-
fically the problem to be dealt with is whether Kentucky can tax, under
Kentucky Revised Statutes, sec. 141.010,3 the passage at death of a non-
resident decedent's interest in a Kentucky partnership.
I See Table of States Wherein Act Has Been Adopted, 7 U.L.A., 1955
Cumulative Annual Pocket Part. 6. Since Kentucky adopted the Act, Arizona
(1954) and Oklahoma (1955) have adopted the Act with modifications. A total
of 36 states now have the Act.
2 Ham, Kentucky Adopts Uniform Partnership Act. 43 Ky. L.J. 5 (1954);
Lictinbergen, The Uniform Partnership Act, 63 U. Pa. L. Rev. 639 (1915).
3 Ky. Rev. Stat., sec. 140.010 reads in part as follows:
All real and personal property within the jurisdiction of this state. . ., all in-
tangible property belonging to nonresidents that has acquired a business situs in
this state, ... which shall pass by will or by the laws regulating intestate succes-
sion, . . . to any person ... is subject to a tax .... (emphasis added)
NOTES
I
UNIFORM PARTNERSHm Act-NATUrE OF DECEAsED PARTNEi's INTEREST
In order to define the applicability of the Kentucky death tax on
the passage of the nonresident decedent's interest in the partnership,
it will first be necessary to examine the nature of that interest, both at
the common law and under the Uniform Partnership Act. At common
law, personal property, both tangible and intangible, passed to the
surviving partners in order that they might satisfy claims against the
partnership. 4 Real property presented a more difficult problem, how-
ever. Historical concepts applicable to interests in land negated any
simplified procedure whereby the remaining partnership debts might
be directly satisfied out of the realty, and it was necessary to invoke
the fiction of equitable conversion to "do justice" to the partnership.
The rationalization was as follows: The legal title of the deceased
partner's share of the real property descended to his heirs, (subject to
dower rights in the widow, of course). However, the surviving part-
ners retained their equity for partnership purposes. Therefore Equity
treated the realty as personalty in order for the partners to dispose of
it, and apply the proceeds to partnership debts.5 Even then, the part-
ners could not themselves convey the title, but could only ask the court,
in exercise of its equity powers, to require the heirs to do so.
A difference of opinion developed as to the extent of the conversion.
The English courts and a minority of American jurisdictions6 treated
the conversion as effective for all purposes. This "out-and-out" con-
version theory resulted in the proceeds of the sale of the realty, after
the partnership debts were settled, being turned over to the personal
representative of the deceased.7
However, most of the American jurisdictions were unwilling to
follow the lead of the English courts, and a more limited effect was
given to the conversion.8 Under this, the pro-tanto view, only so much
of the realty as was required to satisfy the partnership debts was con-
verted. By this rationalization, once the partnership debts were satis-
fied the interest which passed to the heirs (or devisees) of the de-
ceased partner again assumed its character as realty.9
4 Crane, Partnership 218 (2d ed. 1945).
5 Ibid.6 Ham, supra note 2 at 26.
7 Ibid.
8 Crane, op. cit. supra, at 220 states:
The weight of authority has been to the effect that conversion is operative
only to the extent necessary for liquidation, and thereafter, as to anything due the
deceased partner's estate, there is reconversion.
9 2 American Law of Property 43 (1952).
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It is readily apparent that the impact of the Kentucky inheritance
tax statute upon the passage of the interest at death will be affected,
if not in result, at least in rationalization, by whether the "out-and-out"
conversion theory, or the pro-tanto theory is applied in Kentucky. If
the pro-tanto theory is in use, the interest which passes to the survivors
of the deceased partner is real estate and tangible personal property,
and is subject to tax under the first clause of Kentucky Revised Statutes,
sec. 140.010, which reads: "All real and personal property within the
jurisdiction of this state... is subject to a tax. .. ." However, if out-
and-out conversion is applied, the interest which passes is intangible
property,10 and must be taxed, if at all, under a later clause of the same
subsection of the statute: ". . . All intangible property belonging to
nonresidents that has acquired a business situs in this state . . . is
subject to a tax ......
Kentucky, prior to the adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act,
accepted the pro-tanto theory of conversion." The Uniform Act, how-
ever, appears to adopt the out-and-out theory.12 Therefore, as de-
veloped above, the interest which passes at the partner's death is an
intangible property interest. It is conceded that under authority of
Blodgett v. Silberman'3 the domiciliary state of the deceased partner
may constitutionally levy a death tax upon the passage of the in-
tangible partnership interest; when Kentucky attempts to tax the pass-
age of that same partnership interest, the hurdle that must be over-
come is a possible constitutional barrier against Kentucky's also taxing
the passage of the same interest. The Court in the Blodgett case left
this question open, stating: 14
10 See Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1 (1928), where the Court held that
since the partner's interest was merely in the nature of a chose in action (con-
sisting of a right to share in whatever remained after the partnership iab'ties
were satisfied) it was intangible personal property. This case arose in New York,
which adopted the Uniform Partnership Act in 1919; see comment in 25 Mich. L.
Rev. 815 (1928).
11 Strode v. Kramer, 293 Ky. 854, 169 S.W. 2d. 29 (1943); Carter v. Flexner,
92 Ky. 400, 17 S.W. 851 (1891). Prior to the Carter case the court vacillated be-
tween the theories.
12 Ham, supra note 2 at 27 states:
While the situation under the Uniform Partnership Act is not as clear as it
might be, the sum total of the pertinent provisions point rather strongly in the
direction of the English rule of out-and-out conversion. The Act provides tht on
the death of a partner his right in specific property vests in the surviving pirtner
or partners and that a partner's right in specific partnership property is not subect
to dower, curtesy, or allowance to widows, heirs, or next of kin. It is stated
that on dissolution each partner may have the partnership property applied to dis-
charge its liabilities and the surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount owing
to him.
See The Uniform Partnership Act, sec. 38 (1); Ky. Rev. Stat. 862.335(1).
1a 277 U.S. 1 (1928); see supra note 10.
14 Id. at 10.
NOTES
Further, this principle is not to be shaken by the inquiry
into the question whether the transfer of such intangibles ... is
subject to taxation in another jurisdiction. As to that we need not
inquire. It is not the issue in this case.
II
DEFERENCE TO STATE COURT DETErMNATION OF NATuREa OF INTEREST
Before facing directly the constitutional limitations on more than
one state taxing intangibles, it may be appropriate to consider a pos-
sible out which a state court may have when faced with the problem
of taxing the passage of a nonresident decedents interest in a partner-
ship.
As previously stated, the Uniform Partnership Act has the effect of
converting a deceased partner's interest in the specific partnership as-
sets (realty, tangible personalty, etc.) into a right against the partner-
ship. This right, a chose in action, is by nature an intangible property
interest. It is possible that Kentucky could constitutionally disregard
the effect of the conversion when recognition of it would limit the
taxing jurisdiction 15 of the state of partnership (Kentucky). If this be
allowed, then Kentucky could tax the deceased partner's share of the
particular tangible partnership assets physically located within Ken-
tucky. Frick v. Pennsylvania'0 held that the state where tangibles are
permanently located may impose a tax upon their transfer.
While ordinarily the question of whether property is tangible or
intangible is determined by the law of the forum, 17 the Supreme Court
apparently ruled in the Blodgett case that the states' determination is
not conclusive for tax jurisdictional purposes. However, in a sub-
sequent case, Pearson v. McGraw,18 Justice Stone cast doubt upon this
inference when he stated: 19
As I am of opinion that there is nothing in the Constitution
to compel a state to treat federal reserve notes for tax purposes as
chattels were treated in Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 478, and as
no reason has been advanced, even in Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S.
1, 18, for a different view . . . the judgment should, I think, be re-
versed upon that ground .... (emphasis added).
15 It is now generally recognized that the power of the state to tax is not
affected by the doctrine of equtable conversion by will. Frick v. Pennsylvania,
268 U.S. 473 (1925); also see Guterman, Revitalization of Multiple State Death
Taxation, 42 Col. L.R. 1249, 1255 (1942); likewise, the power to tax is not
affected by equitable conversion as a result of a bilateral contract to convey land
in another jurisdiction, In Paul's Estate, 303 Pa. 330, 154 A. 503 (1931), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 630 (1930).
16 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
17 Restatement, Conflicts of Laws, see. 7, comment b (1934).
113.308 U.S. 313 (1939).
19 Id. at 320.
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Thus there is some support for the idea that the Supreme Court might
defer to a determination by the state of partnership that the deceased
partner's interest in the tangible assets is not converted into a chose,
just as it has deferred to a state's determination that a person is domi-
ciled therein, even when more than one state has so found.
20
It should be realized that this rationalization results in a redefinition
of the conversion effected by the Act. It is at least arguable, however,
that such an interpretation by the state should not be struck down by
the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. It is doubtful whether either
the drafters of the Act or the Kentucky legislature intended that the
Act should have the possible effect of limiting the taxing jurisdiction of
the state of the partnership.
However, if out-and-out conversion is not limited so as to deny
its effect upon the state's jurisdiction to tax, then the basic problem
already suggested is that an intangible interest in the nature of a chose
in action is the res, and another state is admittedly able to tax its
passage. Does this preclude the state of the partnership from also tax-
ing it?
III
MULTI-STATE DEATH TAxATioN-SuPREME CouRT DEcIsIoNs
The states' power to tax intangibles has been expanded and con-
tracted like a bellows during the past three decades. Prior to 1930, the
Supreme Court had interpreted the 14th Amendment in such a way
that it did not prohibit multi-state death taxation upon the transfer of
intangibles. 21 Then in 1930 Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota
22
was decided, which was clearly aimed at putting an end to multi-state
inheritance taxation. Minnesota attempted to levy a death tax on the
transfer of bonds which were physically outside the state and owned
by a nonresident, solely on the basis of the fact that the debtor corpora-
tion was domiciled in Minnesota. The Supreme Court held that this
was beyond the jurisdiction of the state, and specifically overruled
earlier cases allowing this. Two years later in First National Bank of
Boston v. Maine23 the Court extended the prohibition to prevent the
20 The Court has generally deferred to a state's determination that a person is
domiciled therein, even when one or more states has so found. See Worcester
Trust Co. v. Riley, 802 U.S. 292 (1927); Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
21 Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189 (1903); Justice Holmes said at 206:
The fact that two states, dealing each with its own law of succession, both
of which the plaintiff in error has to invoke for her rights, have taxed the right
which they respectively confer, gives no cause for complaint on constitutional
grounds.
22 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
23 284 U.S. 312 (1932).
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domiciliary state of a corporation from levying a death tax on the
passage of shares of the corporate stock upon death of a nonresident
owner of such shares. Other cases exhibit this policy.
2 4
To interpret the Constitution so as to deny to the states the power
to levy a death tax on intangibles owned by a nonresident, it was
necessary for the Court: (1) to postulate that the Due Process Clause
implied a policy to protect persons against unreasonable exercise of
the taxing power by a state; and (2) to conclude that the taxing of
the transfer at death of property of a nonresident was unreasonable,
when the sole peg of jurisdiction was the fact that the stock was
evidence of ownership in a corporation domiciled within and protectedf
under the laws of the taxing state. Undoubtedly the Court was in-
fluenced by the desire to avoid the unpleasant political, social and
economic consequences of a multi-state grab against the taxpayer who
had interstate interests.
25
Even during this era of single death taxation, there was a meaning-
ful exception to the rule allowing only the state of domicile to tax in-
tangibles. This exception has generally been referred to as the business
situs rule.20 As might have been expected, this exception gave ex-
clusive jurisdiction to tax to the state where the intangible had its
business situs.
Then in 1939 the Supreme Court decided Curry v. McCanless.
27
Without specifically overruling the line of cases beginning with
Farmers Loan,2 8 the Court held that the 14th Amendment does not
prohibit multiple death taxation of trusts. A resident of Tennessee
had created a trust in Alabama, retaining in herself a life estate. The
trustee and the trust corpus were located in Alabama, and both
states attempted to tax the transfer of her interest at her death. Both
were allowed to. Justice Stone stated:
29
... In effecting her purpose, the testatrix brought some of the legal
interests which she created within the control of one state by selecting
a trustee there and others within the control of the other states by
making her domicile there. She necessarily invoked the aid of the law
of both states, and her legatees, before they can secure and enjoy the
benefits of succession, must invoke the law of both.
Since the single death tax cases had not been specifically overruled,
some uncertainty remained. In 1942, with the decision in Utah v.
24 Beidler v. South Carolina, 282 U.S. 1 (1930); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281
U.S. 586 (1930).
25 Rottschaefer, The Constitution and Socio Economic Change 140 (1948).
26 Wheeling Steel Corporation v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 at 210 (1936).
27 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
2 8 Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 22.
29 Curry v. McCanless, supra note 27 at 372.
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Aldrich ° the trend away from single death taxation became clear.
Aldrich, a New York resident, died owning shares of stock in the
Union Pacific Co., a Utah corporation. Utah levied a death tax upon
the transfer of these shares of stock. The Supreme Court upheld Utah's
right to assess this tax, even though the domiciliary state of the
decedent had already taxed the transfer at death of the same property.
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, said: 31
... We do not think that First National Bank v. Maine should sur-
vive. We overrule it. ... [W]e repeat that there is no constitutional
rule of immunity from taxation of intangibles by more than one State.
In case of shares of stock, "jurisdiction to tax" is not restricted to the
domiciliary State. Another State which has extended benefits or pro-
tection, or which can demonstrate "the practical fact of its power" or
sovereignty as respects the shares . . . may likewise constitutionally
make its exaction....
Although only the Maine case was specifically retired, its companions
were by implication relegated to the same status.
State jurisdiction to tax is now said to depend upon whether the
exercise of the power to tax relates to a legal relationship which the
State has benefited and protected. Justice Douglas, in the Aldrich case,
stated the test as follows:32
A state is free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the
Constitution, if by the practical operation of a tax the state has
exerted its power in relation to opportunities which it has given, to
protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by
the fact of being an orderly, civilized society.
Thus, under Aldrich, a state may subject intangibles to a death tax
so long as it can spell out a legal relationship within the State to which
benefits and protection have been afforded, regardless of whether the
state of the decedent also taxes the passage of that same interest.
Therefore, it appears that Kentucky has the power, even in view of
the change in the nature of the partner's interest wrought by the Uni-
form Partnership Act, to levy a death tax on the passage of a non-
resident partner's interest if a legal relationship within the benefit and
protection theory can be established. There should be no difficulty in
showing that a partnership which exists within this state and carries on
business within this state is enjoying the benefit and protection af-
forded by the laws of this state. Likewise, the interest in the partner-
ship, if it is possible to consider it apart from the partnership, is also
defined and protected by Kentucky law. The partnership interest is
30316 U.S. 174 (1942).
31 Id. at 181.
32 Id. at 178, where Justice Douglas is quoting from Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney
Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
NoTEs
meaningless except in terms of the partnership, and although the legal
title of the property may undergo no change by reason of the death
of the partner, a transfer of the right to his monetary equity has
occurred. Logical consistency would compel recognition of the right
of the state of location of the partnership to tax.33
IV
KiNUcKY's LInm EXERCISE OF TAxiNG PowER-Busn~ss Srrus
Assuming that Kentucky has the power to tax, the question becomes
whether or not it has exercised that power. Kentucky Revised Statutes,
sec. 140.010 makes taxable ".... all intangible property belonging to
nonresidents that has acquired a business situs in this state...."
(emphasis added). By adopting business situs as the peg of jurisdic-
tion for intangibles, Kentucky has confined the scope of its inheritance
tax law so as not to reach all property which it constitutionally may
tax under the later decisions of the Supreme Court. The decisive
factor then, in the problem at hand, is whether the partnership in-
terest has a business situs in Kentucky.
Business situs is analytically a legal conclusion rather than a
criterion. When a court determines, for jurisdiction, that a property
interest has a business situs within the state, it is only concluding that
because of the existence of certain factual criteria, the interest has
come within the sphere of interests which the state benefits and pro-
tects (and therefore, on a quid pro quo theory, should be able to tax).
Trying to pin down just what factual criteria are considered by
the courts to be decisive is an elusive undertaking.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Luckett v. Radio Corporation of Amer-
ica,34 a 19,44 case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals was faced with the
question of whether R.C.A., a New York corporation, should pay in-
come tax on accounts receivable due from a corporation doing business
in Kentucky resulting from the use of certain patent rights granted
by R.C.A. The Court considered the question as one turning on
whether the debt due under the patent contract had acquired a
business situs in Kentucky, and concluded it had not. The debt did
not arise from sources within the state. Since ". . . R.C.A. had neither
33 Cases generally standing for the proposition that the interest of a non-
resident decedent may be taxed by the state where the partnership does business
are: In re Bijur, 127 Misc. 206 216 N.Y.S. 523 (1926); In re Henry, 203 App
Div. 456, 197 N.Y.S. 63 (19221; In re Du Bois' Estate, 163 N.Y.S. 668 (1917);
contra, In re Arbuckle's Estate, 252 Pa. 161, 97 A. 186 (1916).
34299 Ky. 44, 184 S.W. 2d 250 (1944).
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had its patent nor its capital 'in motion' in Kentucky ." the source
had not become localized here.3
5
While the Court reached the correct result here, the discussion of
"business situs" and "source" is unnecessary to the decision. The ap-
plicable statute, Kentucky Revised Statutes, sec. 141.010, first defines
persons liable for income taxes as corporations domiciled within or
doing business within the state; statutory provisions as to "source"
apply only to the apportionment of income once the recipient has be-
come a taxpayer. Therefore the Court, in holding R.C.A. not liable,
should have based the decision not on the business situs of the in-
tangible but on the fact that R.C.A. was not doing business within
Kentucky. The superfluous analysis of business situs based on "source,"
therefore, is of little help in trying to arrive at a workable definition to
apply to the partnership interest.
In Board of Tax Supervisors of Jefferson County v. Baldwin Piano
Co.,36 Justice Sims, for the Court, commented on the business situs rule
as follows:
37
The rule in this jurisdiction is that intangibles such as notes, accounts
receivable, bonds and other like securities owned by a nonresident,
which are not just temporarily brought into the State but are being
held here by a fiduciary or other agent, who controls, manages and
invests them in the owners business in Kentucky so that they become
an integral part thereof, acquired a location or situs in this State for
business purposes and are taxable (citations omitted). But if such in-
tangibles are only temporarily in this State in the agent's or fiduciary's
possession and he does not use them in the owners' business in Ken-
tucky and has no control over them except to forward the intangibles
to the owner within a reasonable time . . . then such intangibles do
not become an integral part of the owners' business and are not
localized in Kentucky and are not taxable (citations omitted).
(emphasis supplied).
In this case the intangibleg were accounts receivable which arose
from the sale of musical instruments by a Kentucky corporation. These
accounts were immediately sold to Baldwin and applied to pay for
goods purchased by the Kentucky Corporation. Since the intangibles
were only temporarily in Kentucky, they did not have a local situs, and
therefore were not subject to ad valorem property taxation.
In 1936 the Kentucky Court decided Commonwealth v. Madden.38
John Madden, a Fayette County resident, and a member of a New
York brokerage partnership, died. Kentucky sought to impose an ad
valorem intangible property tax for several back years on Madden's
35 Id. at 184 S.W. 2d 253.
86296 Ky. 678, 178 S.W. 2d 212 (1944).
37 Id. at 178 S.W. 2d 213.
88265 Ky. 684, 97 S.W. 2d 561 (1936).
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interest in the intangibles (partnership securities) owned by the New
York partnership. The Court denied Kentucky's claim, and held that
the intangibles owned by the partnership had acquired a business
situs in New York. The Court said: 30 "They had become integral parts
of some local business .... All the partnership accounts were carried
with brokers there, the securities purchased and sold were carried in
the names of New York brokers, and the trading was carried on by Mr.
Madden at the brokerage offices [in New York]."
Little help can be drawn from a closely analogous situation, viz.
the taxation of stock held by nonresidents in Kentucky corporations.
Kentucky Revised Statutes, sec. 140.150 (1936) subjects the transfer
of stock of domestic corporations out of the name of a deceased non-
resident of the United States to a 5% tax on its actual value. However,
Kentucky does not tax the transfer of stock in a domestic corporation
owned by a resident of another state. In the middle thirties Kentucky
did levy a tax on the transfer at death of stock in Kentucky corpora-
tions owned by all nonresidents. This practice was declared uncon-
stitutional as to residents of other states in Zahn's Exr. v. State Tax
Commission,40 and Havemeyer v. Coleman,41 the Court relying on the
Supreme Court decision in First National Bank of Boston v. Maine.42
Then in 1936 the legislature codified the existing doctrine and passed
the statute mentioned above limiting the transfer tax to nonresidents
of the United States.
Due to the change in the Supreme Court's attitude on multiple
death taxation, Kentucky now undoubtedly has the power to tax the
transfer of stock in a domestic corporation at the death of any non-
resident; any successful attempt, however, would require under Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes see. 141.010 a finding that the stock has a busi-
ness situs here, since the legislature has not re-enacted a specific statute
on stock transfer.
In Kentucky the question of business situs seems to be decided by a
determination of whether the owner of the intangible is doing business
within the state. Or, stated another way, the factual criterion which
establishes the business situs of a particular intangible asset such as
stocks, bonds, etc., is the use of it as an asset in a business within this
slate. While this test is useful when dealing with intangibles capable
of being used within a business, it is unsatisfactory when applied to
the partnership interest.
30 Id. at 97 S.W. 2d 563.
4"243 Ky. 167, 47 S.W. 2d 925 (1932).
4124,3 Ky. 194, 47 S.W. 2d 1050 (1932).
42 Supra note 23.
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The partnership interest (and the person who succeeds to the
interest) benefits from the protection Kentucky law gives to the part-
nership assets and the partnership entity. The partnership interest
arose because of an agreement in Kentucky with respect to the use of
assets in Kentucky. The nature of the partnership interest is defined
by Kentucky law. Therefore any test of business situs which does not
reach an intangible so factually connected with Kentucky should be
examined closely and expanded, if a workable doctrine can be arrived
at without running afoul of the Constitution and without unreasonably
distorting the statutory language "business situs."
This could be accomplished by adding to the existing category
(use of intangible as an asset in a business located in Kentucky) an-
other one: if the intangible in question is one which normally would
not be used as an asset in a business, and it is an intangible right which
represents property in Kentucky, it has its business situs in Kentucky.
V
CONCLUSION; TAXABmLE
It is possible, by the foregoing analysis, to say that a nonresident
decedent's interest in a Kentucky partnership has a business situs in
Kentucky. Yet strain is caused by the fact that the concept of business
situs is difficult to apply to an intangible such as the one under con-
sideration here. A right to receive money, which is what we are con-
cerned with, is not actively used in business so as to acquire a business
situs anywhere, in the ordinary sense of business situs. However,
there are important policy considerations which should influence the
Court to find that a partner's interest has a business situs in Kentucky.
A state's tax laws should be interpreted to give the state the most
tax revenue possible, without placing an unfair or arbitrary burden
on the taxpayer. There appears to be no good reason why a non-
resident taxpayer should be able to transfer his interest in a Kentucky
partnership tax free at his death, while a resident of Kentucky, per-
haps even in the same partnership, must pay an inheritance tax on the
transfer of his interest at death. In the protection of partnership assets
the state offers each the same benefits. Nor would the result be un-
reasonable to the nonresident who succeeds to the interest. The part-
nership, and indirectly the interest in it, has materially benefited from
the protection afforded by the laws of this state.
Then, too, Kentucky is a debtor state. Unless Kentucky, by legisla-
tive action and judicial interpretation, adopts a favorable attitude
NoTEs
toward taxing intangible property which enjoys the benefit and pro-
tection of Kentucky laws, it will not be deriving the maximum revenue
from the tax base constitutionally available. 43 Therefore, whenever
benefits and protection of Kentucky laws extend to physical assets on
or against which the nonresident decedents representative has a claim,
the business situs should be determined to be in Kentucky in order to
maximize tax revenues.
Kentucky, prior to the Uniform Partnership Act, could tax the
transfer at death of the nonresident partner's right to specific tangible
assets located in Kentucky. It is illogical to say that because the right
to specific property has been converted to a right to receive money
(to be realized from the properties), then the transfer of the interest
at death is no longer taxable.
While the conclusion reached herein would subject the same prop-
erty interest to taxation by two states, that in itself should not, and as
developed previously does not, limit the taxing power of the State of
Kentucky. The apparent hardship on the taxpayer would be more
equitably resolved, if either of the states should be denied the power
to tax, by exclusively allowing the state of the partnership to tax.
Comparing the respective benefits afforded by the respective states,
the claims of the state where the partnership is located should have
priority in tax matters concerning the partnership and interests in the
partnership.
44
The taxing power of debtor states is seriously diminished by trans-
ferring, by means of a legal fiction, the situs of intangible personalty to
the owner's domicile, when in reality it represents property existing in
another jurisdiction. A liberal application of the business situs rule
would undoubtedly result in a more equitable distribution of the tax-
ing power among the states.
Eugene C. Roemele
43 Compare the situation of New York, California, or Illinois and other
creditor states. These states, since the residents have large accumulations of
capital, favor taxes against the person. In this way they obtain the largest tax
revenue possible.
44 Suggested solutions to multi-state death taxation have generally involved
reciprocity. See Legis, Reciprocity and Retaliatory Tax Statutes, 43 Harv. L.R. 641
(1930); Note, 26 Iowa L. Rev. 694 (1940); Kentucky, in 1942, passed a limited
reciprocity provision concerning death taxation of trusts. Ky. Rev. Stat., sec.
140.275 (1942). However, it is debatable whether reciprocity would be beneficial
to Kentucky. Since Kentucky is a debtor state, we have more to lose than to gain
by entering into reciprocal agreements allowing the domiciliary state to tax.
